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Abstract 
This study examines the question on why firms outsource particular information systems (IS) 
functions to varying degrees. It is the first to simultaneously examine three theoretical 
perspectives that represent different rationales for and against IS outsourcing. The first of these 
perspectives is new to the IS outsourcing literature. It acknowledges the systemic character of 
the IS function, i.e. that IS performance critically depends on various sub-functions working 
together effectively. Such systemic influences may be affected through outsourcing particular 
IS functions. Accordingly, they are considered as determinants that reflect the extent to which 
systemic influences are better recognized through in-house as opposed to external service 
provisioning. In order to examine the relative importance of systemic influences in the 
outsourcing decision they are contrasted against two more established ones; the one holds that 
the outsourcing decision is based on a cost comparison including production and transaction 
costs (efficiency); the other recognizes the fact that outsourcing decisions are often influenced 
by environmental forces as reflected by the opinion of influential stakeholders and the level of 
control (i.e. power) that an organization has over the decision. Additionally, this study is the first 
to formulate hypotheses ex ante on the moderating influence of cross-cultural differences on IS 
outsourcing determination. A questionnaire survey was conducted including 180 companies in 
the United States and Germany. The results revealed that efficiency considerations and the 
opinions of external stakeholders were significant determinants of IS outsourcing in both 
countries, though productions costs were more strongly considered than transaction costs. As 
hypothesized, no statistically significant differences between countries could be detected 
regarding the impact of these three factors. In contrast, the consideration of two types of 
systemic influences varied significantly between countries confirming our hypotheses that 
systemic influences are cross-culturally sensitive. In addition, the impact of outsourcing control 
was statistically significant between countries confirming cross-cultural influences. The results 
reveal a number of theoretical and practical implications. 
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1.  Introduction 
While in the early 1990’s information systems outsourcing was a relatively new phenomenon 
dominated by large-scale outsourcing deals in the United States, it is now a globally recognized 
and accepted organizational option for managing the IS function of the firm. The global reach of 
IS outsourcing is indicated by a more balanced distribution of IS outsourcing expenditures 
across countries (TPI, 2005). And yet, outsourcing is no panacea for the management of IS 
services for all organizations. This is reflected by a considerable level of variation among 
organizations regarding the extent to which IS functions are outsourced. Most organizations 
prefer a selective outsourcing approach where only particular IS functions and certain portions 
of IS functions are handed over to external service providers (Apte et al., 1997, Lacity et al., 
1995).  
 
The observed variation in outsourcing behavior has motivated research to examine the 
determinants of the IS outsourcing decision. The determinants explain why some organizations 
prefer to outsource a higher percentage of their overall IS function to external service providers 
than other organizations. These determinants represent different streams of theorizing, such as 
economic, strategic, or institutional (Dibbern et al., 2004). In spite of these multiple 
perspectives, however, there are hardly any quantitative studies that considered multiple 
steams of reasoning within the same study. Accordingly, there is little knowledge about the 
relative importance of particular perspectives for the IS outsourcing decision.  
 
Close examination of previously established IS outsourcing determinants (Dibbern et al., 2004), 
it is also interesting to note that the majority of factors are not IS-specific. Factors, such as 
strategic importance, production costs or transaction costs can be equally applied to explain 
the sourcing of other business functions, such as marketing or human resources. One unique 
feature of IS that has occasionally been mentioned in IS outsourcing research is its cross-
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functional character (Dibbern et al., 2004). On the one hand, the IS function serves a number 
of other business functions and hence is an integral part of many business processes. On the 
other hand, the IS function is itself divided into various sub-functions that are often organized 
independently, i.e. as separate units, but still need to be integrated to form a coherent whole. 
IS performance usually depends on all IS sub-functions working together effectively. These 
systemic impacts that exist both between IS sub-functions as well as between IS and other 
business functions are largely affected by the organizational arrangement of these functions. 
Accordingly, such systemic influences may need to be considered when evaluating how IS 
effectiveness is influenced through outsourcing.  
 
Finally, it is striking that the majority of studies on the determinants of IS outsourcing have 
been done in the Anglo-American countries of the United States and Great Britain. This raises 
the question of the generalizability of theoretical assertions and empirical findings across 
countries. The results of a limited number of studies that explored IS outsourcing determinants 
across countries revealed a number of national differences that suggest that national culture 
may be influential on the IS outsourcing decision (Apte et al., 1997, Barthélemy and Geyer, 
2001, Tiwana and Bush, 2007). This is in line with cross-cultural research that has questioned 
the universality of management and organizational behavior theories (Cheng et al., 2001, 
England, 1983, Hofstede, 1983a, 1993, 1994, Triandis, 1982). For example, Triandis (1982, p. 
139) stated: 
 
“Culture is the human-made part of the environment (...). Its significance for organiza-
tional behavior is that it operates at such a deep level that people are not aware of its 
influences. It results in unexplained patterns of thought that seem so natural that most 
theorists of social behavior fail to take them into account. As a result, many aspects of 
organizational theories produced in one culture may be inadequate in other cultures.” 
 
 6 
Based on the preceding discussion, the objective of this study is threefold. First, it seeks to 
consider multiple rationales for or against IS outsourcing, each representing different 
theoretical perspectives, simultaneously for exploring their relative importance. Second, it 
seeks to introduce systemic influences as a fairly new idiosyncratic IS-related dimension that 
acknowledges the highly integrated character of the IS function both inherently (i.e. across its 
sub-functions) and externally (i.e. with other business functions). Finally, this study seeks to 
consider the effect of national culture on the IS outsourcing decision. It is the first contribution 
that builds a priori hypotheses about the moderating impact of cultural dimensions on the 
impact of the previously deduced theoretically grounded determinants of the IS outsourcing 
decision.  
 
Overall, this study contributes to previous research that sought to develop comprehensive 
frameworks on the determinants of IS outsourcing. It also extends previous theory contributions 
by combining the resource-based theory with systems theory. Moreover, by integrating cross-
cultural dimensions into the theoretical frame, the generalizability of mid-range theory on IS 
outsourcing across nations is increased (Preston et al., 2006).  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature 
review on the determinants of IS outsourcing. Based on this assessment, a theoretical 
framework on the determinants of IS outsourcing is developed including hypotheses on the 
moderating impact of cross-cultural differences. Then, the method for model testing is 
introduced and the results of a survey including companies from the United States and 
Germany are presented. Finally, the limitations and implications of the study are discussed and 
final conclusions are drawn. 
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2.  Literature Review 
Determinants of IS Outsourcing 
The study of the determinants of IS outsourcing has already reached a relatively high level of 
maturity, as indicated by the use of multiple theoretical lenses and research approaches, 
including different empirical and non-empirical methods (Dibbern et al., 2004). When closely 
examining the nature of all of the determinants, five main spheres can be distinguished (See 
Figure 1). 
 
The first category is rational decision criteria. It reflects the actual criteria that decision makers 
in organizations are meant to apply when evaluating alternative sourcing options and making 
the final decision. The most often cited argument is that outsourcing is the result of a cost 
comparison of in-house governance versus outsourcing including both production costs and 
transaction costs (Ang and Straub 1998; Barthélemy 2001). Surprisingly, there are few 
quantitative empirical studies that explicitly looked at factors besides costs in a comparative 
manner. To date, it is qualitative research that has suggested that some organizations enter 
into outsourcing for various strategic reasons (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998; McLellan et 
al. 1995), to improve service quality (Clark et al. 1995), or to gain access to better IS resources 
(Cross 1995). In particular, conceptual studies have also pointed to various types of risks 
associated with outsourcing, such as the loss of organizational learning (Earl 1996), or the loss 
of cross-functional skills (Quinn and Hilmer 1994). 
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Figure 1. Synthesis of the Determinants of IS Outsourcing 
 
The second major stream of determinants consists of various types of IS related contingencies. 
The theoretical idea is that by analyzing the attributes of an organization’s current IS functions, 
conclusions can be drawn about the appropriateness of IS outsourcing. For example, based on 
a combination of resource-based and resource-dependence theory, it has been argued that 
organizations that perceive a gap between the actual and desired base of IS resources will 
more likely outsource particular IS functions (Teng et al., 1995). Most prominent among these 
contingency views is transaction cost economics (TCE). It is argued that outsourcing a 
particular IS function is less likely due to efficiency disadvantages if it is characterized by 
certain contingencies, such as a high level of asset specificity or technological uncertainty (Ang 
and Cummings 1997; Nam et al. 1996). Notably, the rationales on which these impacts are 
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based equal the rational decision criteria that were introduced earlier. Accordingly, there should 
be a direct logical link between both categories, as depicted in Figure 1 (e.g., higher asset 
specificity leads to transaction cost disadvantages and hence the degree of outsourcing should 
be low). 
 
Another group of contingencies is that of firm characteristics, such as a firm’s financial situation 
or strategic orientation (Loh and Venkatraman 1992a; Smith et al. 1998; Teng et al. 1995). The 
impact of these non-IS factors has received only mixed support in empirical studies. More 
consistent results were found for the influence of various forces of the internal and external 
environment of an organization.1 External forces comprise the influence of peer organizations 
or the outsourcing behavior of other organizations (Ang and Cummings 1997; Hu et al. 1997; 
Loh and Venkatraman 1992b). Internal forces may include issues such as politics and power 
asymmetries within organizations (Arnett and Jones 1994; Goodstein et al. 1996; Lacity and 
Hirschheim 1993; Palvia 1995).  
 
Finally, in analyzing previous research on IS outsourcing, it is worthwhile to examine the unit of 
analysis of these studies more closely (Dibbern et al., 2004). Early research has mostly 
abstracted from individual IS functions and treated IS as a homogeneous function. However, 
quite soon it became apparent that outsourcing is predominately performed selectively, i.e. that 
organizations choose to outsource some IS functions wholly or partially, while keeping others 
in-house (Lacity et al., 1996). The recognition of selective outsourcing has lead to the trend of 
concentrating on particular IS functions or even transactions or projects as the unit of analysis. 
This selective view, however, bears the danger of ignoring potential interactions among 
different IS functions and loosing the overall picture of the entire IS function. For example, 
Lacity et al. (1995) observed that if the development of a software application that required 
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data from many other applications was outsourced, the vendor’s lack of understanding of the 
respective interfaces led to substantial project delays and budget overruns. To date, hardly any 
research has investigated such systemic influences within and across IS functions. Hence, little 
knowledge exists about the extent to which they are recognized in the IS outsourcing decision. 
In cases were systems’ interconnectedness was conceptually recognized as an important 
factor, no information was provided about their empirical relevance (Willcocks and Fitzgerald 
1993). This reinforces recent calls for explicitly analyzing systemic impacts in boundary choices 
(Jacobides and Billinger 2006). 
 
In addition, there is minimal research that has examined different types of determinants within 
the same empirical study. Thus, there is little knowledge about the relative importance of IS 
outsourcing decision factors. Notable exceptions are Ang and Slaughter (1997) that studied 
how the influence of peer banks and bank regulators on IS outsourcing is moderated by 
different types of task-related contingencies. In a similar vein, Teng et al. (1996) examined the 
moderating influence of an organization’s strategic orientation on the impact of resource 
contingences. Moreover, the rival influence of multiple contingencies stemming from different 
theories, such as transaction cost economics and the resource-based view has been examined 
(Poppo and Zenger, 1998, Tiwana and Bush, 2007). However, since the direct effect of these 
contingencies on the IS outsourcing decision can often not be clearly attributed to one 
particular rationale, e.g. efficiency or effectiveness (or transaction cost economic versus 
resource-based reasoning (Carter and Hodgson, 2006)), there is still little knowledge about the 
relative importance of particular types of rationality on the outsourcing decision. 
 
Finally, while there are a few studies that explored IS outsourcing determinants (Apte et al., 
1997, Tiwana and Bush, 2007), or IS outsourcing behavior (Barthélemy and Geyer, 2001, 
                                                                                                                                                      
1  For the differentiation between internal and external environment, see e.g. Paulson Gjerde et al. 
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Barthélemy and Geyer, 2005) across countries, little attempt has been made to theoretically 
explain the observed country differences. In particular, there is a lack of integration of country-
specific factors (e.g. cross-cultural dimensions) into the theoretical frame in order to extend the 
generalizability of mid-range theories on IS outsourcing determination. 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, this study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by 
considering systemic influences as separate decision criteria in the IS sourcing decision. We 
aim to test their impact alongside well-established influences, such as the rationale of cost 
efficiency and the influential role of external and internal forces. Moreover, the moderating 
influence of cross-cultural differences on determinants of IS outsourcing will be considered. 
Non-IS contingencies are not further examined due to their relatively low empirical support in 
previous studies. Moreover, IS task-related contingencies are not included since they are 
logically related to particular rational decision criteria and their explicit recognition would go 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
3.  Theoretical Framework 
Based on the previous literature review, we will develop hypotheses on the impact of selected 
determinants of IS outsourcing, as well as on the impact of selected cross-cultural dimensions. 
We base the deduction of hypotheses on outsourcing determinants on three sets of theoretical 
perspectives: (1) resourced-based theory along with notions of systems theory, (2) transaction 
cost economics and (3) the theory of planned behavior (adapted to the organizational context) 
along with notions of institutional theory. A graphical representation of the resulting theoretical 
framework is presented in Figure 2. Essentially, the model suggests that an IS function is 
outsourced to a lower extent if decision makers see advantages of in-house provision in 
efficiency (production and transaction costs) and if effectiveness, as exemplified by systemic 
                                                                                                                                                      
(2002) 
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impacts and systemic view capabilities of IS personnel, is seen to be negatively affected 
through outsourcing. Moreover, organizations tend to outsource more of a particular IS function 
if the opinion of referential others about outsourcing is positive and if the organization has a 
high as opposed to low level control over the process of outsourcing. The discussion below 
elaborates upon each set of factors and explains why certain linkages are expected to be 
moderated by cross-cultural dimensions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical Framework on IS Sourcing 
 
Effectiveness through Systemic Influences 
According to the resource-based view, organizations generally differ in their base of resources 
(Barney, 1991, Penrose, 1959, Wernerfelt, 1984) and capabilities, i.e. the “(…) capacity to 
deploy Resources, usually in combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired 
end” (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993, p. 35 - italics original). Thus, as far as client and vendor 
have different resources and capabilities, their ability to achieve IS effectiveness likely differs 
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as well. IS effectiveness is a multidimensional construct that can be viewed from different 
angles. DeLone and McLean (1992) have distinguished between system quality, information 
quality, user satisfaction, use, individual impact, and organizational impact (later adapted to 
include service quality, DeLone and McLean, 2003). These different categories are proposed to 
be hierarchically composed such that high level organizational impacts (strategic or operative) 
are dependent on base level impacts such as system and information quality. Previous 
research on IS outsourcing has largely focused on the implications of the IS sourcing decision 
on high level strategic impacts (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998, McLellan et al., 1995) or on 
service and support quality (Hirschheim and Lacity, 2000, Reponen, 1993, Teng et al., 1995). 
Base level implications, such as implications for system quality have been rarely considered 
(e.g. information quality, Teng et al., 1995). 
 
This study explicitly addresses base level implications of IS outsourcing by recognizing how the 
systemic impact is influenced by the outsourcing of a particular IS function. Systemic impact 
reflects the extent to which the IS sub-functions and sub-components are synergistically 
integrated to leverage overall IS performance. It recognizes the fact that IS effectiveness is 
achieved through the joint effect of all IS sub-functions working together rather than by just 
increasing the performance of each function separately. Such sub-functions may include 
applications development and applications maintenance; systems and data center operations; 
design and maintenance of networks and telecommunication centers; user support and 
training; as well as overall planning and management (Grover et al., 1994). It is often hard to 
separate the effectiveness of one particular IS component, such as the application software 
(i.e., the software development and maintenance function) from that of the overall IS (i.e., the 
overall IS function) (cf. Hamilton and Chervany, 1981, Pitt et al., 1995). What matters is the 
effect of the combined effort of all IS components and services working together. For example, 
the application software per se is often of little use if it is not based on a reliable and secure 
operating environment, or if it is not dynamically connected to other source or target 
 14 
applications via powerful networks in order to establish meaningful identification, gathering, 
processing, and transfer of information.  
 
This view is consistent with the premise of systems theory, which emphasizes the difference 
between the whole and its parts (Bertalanffy, 1979, Luhmann, 1994, Rapoport, 1988). Lacity 
and Willcocks (1995), in referring to related work from Milgrom and Roberts (1995, 1990) on 
complementary activities in manufacturing, argue that similar phenomena do exist in the field of 
information systems.  
 
“An example of complementary transactions in the information systems field is building 
an information network in conjunction with implementing new application software. As 
standalone transactions, the network and software add little value ... it is the combined 
benefits of building both that add value” (p. 240). 
 
According to Thompson (1967), the type of interdependency that exists between organizational 
sub-functions dictates the appropriate organizational structure. For example, if two functions 
are characterized by reciprocal interdependence, it may be beneficial to organize these 
functions under one common umbrella in order to enable close interaction and integration of 
these sub-functions. Thus, there is a close link between the relational attributes of 
organizational functions and their organization. Organizational sub-functions may also be 
viewed as modules that need to be integrated under a common architecture (Schilling, 2002). 
Thus, for an organization it is not only sufficient to build up specific capabilities for performing 
particular IS functions, but also for achieving systemic impacts. This requires capabilities in 
architectural design and system integration as well as the ability to achieve synergistic effects 
form different IS functions working together. When it comes to outsourcing parts of an 
organization’s IS function, the question is raised whether such systemic impacts can still 
effectively be accounted for (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006). For example, when it comes to the 
outsourcing of application software services, the external vendor needs to have a certain level 
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of understanding of the various interfaces that exist between the application software for which 
he is responsible and other applications as well as other IS functions (e.g., data center 
operations or telecommunications networks). Accordingly, systemic impacts should reasonably 
be accounted for in the IS outsourcing decision. The question is raised, whether systemic 
impacts can be appropriately addressed if a particular IS function is performed by an external 
vendor rather than in-house. This is reflected by the following hypothesis. 
H1: The more the systemic impact of the IS function is threatened through outsourcing a 
particular IS function to an external vendor as opposed to keeping it in-house, the less this 
function is being outsourced. 
Besides considering systemic influences at the functional level, they may also be taken into 
account at the individual level. As such, systemic view capability refers to the capacity of 
organizational members of having an integrated view of the organization, i.e., taking into 
account how work in one area fits in and affects all other work throughout the organization.2 
Notably, this systemic view capability goes beyond the boundaries of an organization’s IS 
functions. In a recent claim for a stronger recognition of systems thinking in the IS discipline, 
Alter (2004) argued that IS development would benefit from methods and procedures that 
systematically acknowledge the organizational context and the social environment in which 
systems are embedded, i.e. the work systems. In a similar vein, shared knowledge between 
the IT-domain and the user domain has been shown to be critical for IS effectiveness (Ray et 
al., 2005). These assertions characterize IS as open systems that are typified by constant 
interchanges with their environment and accordingly a constant state of flux (Bertalanffy, 1979). 
Indeed, an IS may be viewed as a subsystem of another broader system (Mora et al., 2003). 
Thus, in line with the resource-based view, IS professionals that acknowledge how their work 
                                                
2  This definition is based on the concept of systems thinking ability which as been referred to as 
the “(…) the ability to see the world as a complex system, in which we understand that you can’t just do 
one thing, and that everything is connected to everything else” (Sterman, 2000, p. 4), or as “(…) being 
able to see the whole or context of a situation and its interconnections to its environment” 
(Wolstenholme, 2003, p. 20) – cited by Alter (2004, p. 758). 
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relates to other work throughout the organization – beyond the boundaries of IS – may be seen 
as valuable resources.  If systemic view capabilities are not accounted for, the alignment of IS 
functions with overall organizational objectives may be threatened (Bacon and Fitzgerald, 
2001). Accordingly, it is crucial for the IS outsourcing decision, whether such systemic view 
capabilities are better available in-house or through outsourcing. If in-house personnel for a 
particular IS function is seen to be advantageous in its system view capabilities, then 
outsourcing becomes less likely. Moreover, the systemic impact of IS may be better taken care 
of in-house if in-house personnel has better systemic view capabilities than vendor personnel. 
This is reflected by the following two hypotheses: 
H2a: The higher the systemic view capabilities of in-house as opposed to personnel of an 
external vendor in performing an IS function, the less this function will be outsourced. 
H2b: The higher the comparative advantage of in-house personnel as opposed to that of an 
external vendor in its systemic view capability, the higher the comparative in-house advantage 
in achieving a systemic impact. 
Efficiency Factors  
According to TCE, the make or buy decision should be guided by economic criteria 
(Williamson, 1981). It is argued that the governance choice depends on both production and 
transaction cost differences between the firm and the market. The external vendor is supposed 
to be advantageous in realizing economies of scale and scope due to its ability to provide the 
same type of service for a larger pool of customers than client organizations could realize in-
house (Ang and Straub, 1998). In particular, the vendor’s ability to economize on past 
experiences from multiple customer accounts may explain lower production costs (Levina and 
Ross, 2003). There is evidence, however, that contrary to Williamson’s (1981, 1985) original 
assertions, the external vendor may not generally be superior in production costs. Indeed, 
there are cases where clients have consciously decided against outsourcing due to vendors 
charging substantially higher prices versus their in-house costs, reflecting the vendor’s cost 
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plus profit margin (Dibbern et al., 2003, Hirschheim and Lacity, 2000). Accordingly, the decision 
of whether it is more production cost efficient to keep an IS function in-house or to outsource it 
to an external vendor should be made on a case by case basis leading to the following 
hypothesis: 
H 3: The higher the comparative production cost advantage of the in-house as opposed to 
outsourced provision of an IS function, the less it will be outsourced. 
Like production costs, transaction costs also should not be neglected (Ang and Straub, 1998, 
Barthélemy, 2001, Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b). Transaction costs are all costs in terms of 
time, effort, and money spent that arise when delegating tasks of an IS function to one or more 
agents. They refer to costs for activities such as “ … planning, adapting, and monitoring task 
completion under alterative governance structures” (Williamson, 1981, p. 552f.). These 
transaction costs can occur both in-house and when outsourcing to an external vendor. Hence, 
it is the difference between in-house and outsourcing transaction costs that determines the 
sourcing choice (Williamson, 1981). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H 4: The higher the comparative transaction cost advantage of the in-house as opposed to 
outsourced provision of an IS function, the less it will be outsourced. 
Environmental Influences and Constraints 
So far, it has been assumed that the sourcing decision represents a rational decision based on 
efficiency and effectiveness criteria. This view has been partially contradicted by other studies 
showing that an organization’s sourcing decision can be influenced by other factors, such as 
various internal and external environmental forces (see Literature Review).  
 
Similar influences have been largely substantiated at the level of individual decision making. 
According to the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), an individual’s 
decision to perform or not perform a behavior is influenced by the perceived subjective norm, 
i.e. the perceived social pressure of referential others. Another factor that goes beyond a 
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motivationally oriented evaluative appraisal of alternative behaviors (i.e. attitude towards a 
behavior) is perceived behavioral control which reflects a person’s ease or difficulty of 
performing a behavior. The concepts from the TPB can be meaningfully applied to the 
organizational context (Cordano and Frieze Hanson, 2000). They acknowledge the fact that 
external and internal forces can support or constrain the outsourcing decision independent of 
an organization’s rational comparison of alternative sourcing options.  
 
Since the TPB has been designed for explaining individual rather than organizational behavior, 
both concepts need to be slightly adapted to fit the organizational context. One important 
difference of the organizational context is that decisions, such as IS outsourcing, are usually 
not solely made by single individuals but rather by groups, e.g. consortia. Moreover, decision 
makers in organizations have to consider the objectives of the organization for which they 
work, such as profit motives, which may override their personal preferences to a certain extent. 
Most generally, both dimensions are therefore defined as follows: Subjective norm is referred 
to as the opinion of others, reflecting the extent to which persons or groups whose opinion is 
important for an organization think that the organization (and not an individual decision maker) 
should outsource an IS function rather than keeping it in-house. This notion is consistent with 
the argument that an organization’s “enacted” environment actively shapes organizational 
behavior (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 63). Consultants, managers from peer organizations, 
or various types of public media could present actively perceived influences from external 
stakeholders (Ang and Cummings, 1997, Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a, Loh and 
Venkatraman, 1992). Behavioral Control is referred to as control over the outsourcing decision 
process reflecting the extent to which an organization has unlimited power of direction over all 
necessary activities associated with outsourcing an IS function to an external service provider. 
For example, the outsourcing decision was found to be influenced by politics (i.e., the exercise 
of power by various stakeholder groups) (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b, Lacity et al., 1994, 
Lacity and Willcocks, 1997, Palvia, 1995). Moreover legislative regulations could constrain 
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decision flexibility (Barthélemy and Geyer, 2005). One would expect that the less the 
implementation of an outsourcing decision is constrained by various forces, the easier it is for 
an organization to outsource application services. Together, these influences of an 
organization’s social and institutional environment lead to the following two hypotheses: 
H5: The more positive the opinion of influential others towards an organization’s outsourcing of 
an IS function, the more it will be outsourced. 
H6: The lower the perceived control over the process of outsourcing an IS function, the less it 
will be outsourced. 
Finally, in accordance with previous studies on IS sourcing, firm size is added as a control 
variable (Ang and Straub, 1998, Sobol and Apte, 1995). 
Proposed Cross-Cultural Differences 
The preceding network of hypotheses (see Figure 1) may be viewed as a mid-range theory that 
seeks to explain variations in the extent to which organizations outsource application services. 
While we believe it is reasonably robust in its coverage, it should be clear that the objective is 
not to definitively establish the model per se. Rather, it is to present a plausible model for the 
second goal of this study, that being whether the relationships among constructs are influenced 
by cross-cultural influences. This recognizes the fact that culturally programmed, deeply 
grounded behavioral beliefs, values, and predispositions of key decision leaders within firms 
(Hofstede, 1993) as well as related culture-specific artifacts (e.g., legislation and educational 
systems) can have a significant effect on firm level decisions (Dickson and Weaver, 1997, 
Hofstede, 1993, Triandis, 1982).  
 
Cross-cultural research has identified numerous cross-cultural dimensions. An overview and 
categorization is provided by Lytle et al. (1995). Based on this overview, we identified four 
dimensions in a deductive way that are related to the constructs and relationships of our 
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previously developed framework on IS outsourcing determination (See Table 1). Only those 
dimensions that clearly relate to an organizational context were considered. 
Table 1. Selected Cross-Cultural Dimensions 
Category 
(Lytle et al. 
1995) 
Cultural Dimension Study Related to following construct of theoretical framework 
Individualism versus 
collectivism  
(1980, Hofstede, 
1983b, 1991) 
• Comparative systemic impact advantage 
• Comparative systemic view capability 
advantage Relationship between 
societal 
members Analytical versus 
integrative view of the 
firm 
Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner 
(1994) 
• Comparative systemic impact advantage 
• Comparative systemic view capability 
advantage 
Motivational 
orientation 
Individualistic versus 
communitarian (Self-
orientation vs. 
collectivity-orientation) 
Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner 
(1994) 
• Comparative systemic impact advantage 
• Comparative systemic view capability 
advantage 
Patterns of 
institutions and 
social systems 
Bargaining power of 
unions, works councils 
Argyres and 
Liebeskind (1999) • Decision process control 
 
The first of these cultural dimensions is individualism-collectivism. According to Hofstede 
(1980), it reflects the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. A related 
dimension is that of individualism versus communitarianism which is defined similarly 
(Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993, p. 51). This dimension is based on the “self-
orientation versus collectivity-orientation” concept from Parson and Shils (1951). Today, 
individualism-collectivism is by far the most extensively studied cultural dimension in the field of 
cross-cultural research. Numerous definitions and operationalizations of individualism-
collectivism have been developed and applied in cross-cultural research. In separating the 
forest from the trees, so to speak, Hui and Triandis (1986) have identified seven different 
categories of collectivism. Two of them are (1) the people’s concern about how their decisions 
could affect others in their collectivity; and (2) the belief in the correspondence of one’s own 
outcomes, both positive and negative, with the outcome of others. These two aspects of 
collectivism show a striking correspondence with two of the constructs of our theoretical model 
on IS sourcing, namely the comparative in-house advantages in systemic view capability as 
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well as in systemic impact. Another cultural dimension that is closely related to these two 
systemic variables is the analytical versus integrative view dimension (Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars, 1993, Trompenaars and Hamden-Turner, 1994), which reflects the extent to 
which a firm is perceived as a collection of tasks, functions, people, and machines (analytical 
view)  rather than as a group of related persons working together (integrative view). 
 
It may be argued that in cultures that are more collectivist and that have more of an integrative 
view of the corporation, organizational decision makers are more sensitive to systemic 
influences. This is based on the notion that in cultures that have a strong focus on group 
performance and that strongly consider the interdependency between tasks, functions, and 
people, decision makers may generally value systemic impacts and systemic view capability of 
individuals higher than strongly individualist cultures, where the focus is on individual 
performance and on treating tasks, functions, and people independently of each other. Thus, in 
more collectivist nations decision makers may more strongly consider differences in achieving 
systemic influences between in-house and outsourced provision of IS services than more 
individualist countries. Moreover, decision makers in more collectivist nations may be more 
inclined to consider whether in-house personnel or the staff of external vendors shows better 
systemic view capabilities in doing their work. This is reflected by the following hypotheses: 
H7: The relationship between comparative in-house advantages in systemic impact and the 
degree of outsourcing is stronger in more collectivist and less individualist nations. 
H8: The relationship between comparative advantages in systemic view capabilities of in-
house professionals and the degree of outsourcing is stronger in more collectivist and less 
individualist nations. 
The third construct whose effect is proposed to be culturally sensitive is decision process 
control. The impact of this determinant may be particularly high in institutional environments 
where the IS outsourcing decision is strongly regulated. In particular, labor right regulations 
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may have a considerable impact on the IS outsourcing decision. As noted by Lytle et al. (1995) 
patterns of institutions and social systems may be seen as culturally induced artifacts that 
reflect overall cultural values and norms of a society. As such, significant variation can be 
observed between nations in the extent to which labor markets are regulated. For example, 
Argyres and Liebeskind (1999, p. 59) stated that countries such as Germany and France 
accord greater bargaining power to labor unions and work councils than other countries (See 
also Kieser, 1990, Richardi, 1990). In particular codetermination provides employees the right 
to participate in organizational decisions that impact their personal disposition or the disposition 
of the group that they belong to (Chmielewicz, 1990). In countries with such strong labor 
regulations, organizations need to find ways to cope with them when making IS outsourcing 
decisions. This need to react to labor market regulations (because they exist) makes decision 
makers more likely to consider them in the IS outsourcing decision. Some organizations may 
be able to cope with regulations easily. Hence, their perceptions of control over the outsourcing 
decision would be reflected by higher levels of IS outsourcing. Others may feel that regulations 
strongly limit their control over the process of outsourcing and hence would outsource less. In 
nations with little regulations, the perception of control over the process of outsourcing may 
vary among organizations as well. However, for them the need to react to institutional 
constraints is not as severe. Accordingly, decision process control plays a much less important 
role for them in the IS outsourcing decision. This is reflected by the following hypothesis: 
H9: The impact between perceived control over the process outsourcing and the degree of 
IS outsourcing is stronger in countries with more restrictive labor regulations. 
In summary, there are three relationships that are proposed to be culturally sensitive. 
Significant differences in the strength of these three relationships are expected between 
countries that are known to differ in the respective cross-cultural dimensions. The other 
relationships (efficiency, opinion of others) are expected not to significantly differ between 
nations. 
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4.  Method 
Data 
Choice of Countries. Data for this study was gathered via a mailed questionnaire survey. In 
order to account for national differences the questionnaire was administered to organizations in 
two countries. On the one hand, these countries should be similar in their industry structure, 
economic power, and the maturity of IS within corporations (OECD, 2002). On the other hand, 
both countries should differ in the cross-cultural dimensions of the theoretical framework. Two 
countries that meet these requirements are Germany and the United States. The differences in 
cultural dimensions between both countries are shown in Table 2. 
The questionnaire was developed both in English and German language. To ensure fit 
between both versions, the initial English version was translated into German and then back-
translated by a native American, who works as an English lecturer in Germany (Douglas and 
Craig, 1999). No significant differences could be detected which increased the confidence in 
the fit between the English and the German version.  
Choice of Respondents. The questionnaires were administered to the highest ranking IS 
executives of organizations in the United States and Germany. Chief IS executives were 
deemed as the most appropriate informants, since they are most familiar with an organization’s 
IS sourcing choices and its wider implications for the entire organization. The selection of this 
group as key informants is consistent with prior studies on IS outsourcing (cf. Ang and Straub, 
1998, Apte et al., 1997, Aubert et al., 1996, Barthélemy and Geyer, 2001, Poppo and Zenger, 
1998, Teng et al., 1995). The questionnaire was pre-tested in two rounds of face-to-face 
meetings with an experienced CIO in Germany. His comments were considered in the 
development of the questionnaire in order to ensure that all questionnaire items were 
understandable and could be answered by the intended group of respondents. 
 
Table 2. Instances of Cultural Dimensions in Germany versus United States 
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 Cultural Dimension Study Germany United States 
Individualistic versus 
communitarian (Self-
orientation vs. collectivity-
orientation) 
Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner 
(1994) 
Medium individualism Relatively high individualism 
Individualism versus 
collectivism 
Hofstede (1980, 
1983b, 1991) 
Medium individualism 
(rank 15 from 50; 
index 67) 
Highest individualism of all 
countries  
(rank 1 from 50; index 91) 
Analytical versus 
integrative view of the firm 
Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner 
(1994) 
Toward integrative view Toward analytical view 
Bargaining power of unions, 
works councils 
Argyres and 
Liebeskind (1999) 
Relatively high 
 
• § 613 BGB regulates 
the transfer of 
organizational units to 
legally independent 
organizations 
(“Betriebsübergang”) 
(Koffka, 1997, p. 124ff.) 
• Works constitution act 
guarantees the right of 
employee participation 
and codetermination in 
social, economic, and 
personal matters 
(Richardi, 1990, p. 
1282) 
Medium 
 
Choice of Industries. In order to avoid potential industry influences, only two industries were 
considered that play a significant role in both countries: the finance and the machinery industry 
(Germany: 406 Finance, 552 Machinery; United States: 676 Finance, 591 Machinery). 
 
Choice of IS functions. In order to account for the practice of selective IS outsourcing, the focus 
was set on two particular IS functions: applications development and applications maintenance. 
Respondents were asked to answer each question of the questionnaire for both the 
development and for the maintenance of software applications (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). The 
choice of two IS functions also allowed us to control for differences between IS functions. 
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Response Rate. Overall, 180 usable questionnaires were returned from a total sample of 2130 
companies (Germany: 77 Finance, 62 Machinery; United States: 17 Finance, 24 Machinery). 
This equals an overall response rate of 8.4% (3.4% in the United States and 15.1% in 
Germany).3 Since the survey included questions about both the development and the 
maintenance of software applications, the sample for the country comparison includes 278 
decisions on the sourcing of software applications in Germany and 82 cases in the United 
States.  Based on recent simulation studies analyzing the 75 versus 150 scenario (Chin, 2003), 
our sample size provides a power either near or above the recommended 0.80 level. 
Measures 
Each of the constructs from our model was measured with a block of indicators (questionnaire 
items). Whenever possible, existing measures from prior empirical studies were adopted. An 
overview of the constructs and measurement items is provided in Table 3. In the case of 
systemic impact and systemic view capability, items were developed based on the construct 
definition.  The specific facets in the definition (e,g.,Chin et al., 2008) were determined to 
develop the corresponding terms in the items. The items were presented to four noted IS 
outsourcing researchers in order to ensure content and face validity as well as readability.  As 
noted earlier, the items were pre-tested in two rounds of face-to-face meetings with an 
experienced CIO and the comparative fit of translations from English to German and back 
provided further assurance. Discriminant, convergent, and nomological validity are then 
subsequently assessed using the survey data. 
                                                
3 This relatively low response rate may partly be attributed to the cross-national survey procedure. 
Based on her literature review, Harzing (2000) concludes: “Cross-national mail surveys aiming at 
industrial population generate very low response rates. If questionnaires are not either preceded or 
followed by telephone contact, response rates typically vary between 6% and 16%.” Although the U.S. 
survey packages were sent off from the U.S., and follow-up phone calls conducted in both countries, 
differences in the response rates between Germany and the U.S. could not be prevented. Indeed, the 
response rates differ significantly. It should be noted, however, that for the U.S. similar results were 
obtained in a more recent IS outsourcing mail survey by Poppo and Zenger (1998). They achieved a 
response rate of 5% (152 from 3000) in the United States. We were also unable to detect any significant 
non-response bias using the extrapolation procedure of Armstrong and Overton (1977). 
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Most of the items were measured on a (positive-to-negative) five-point Likert scale ranging 
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, with “neither agree nor disagree” as a mid-point. 
For measures of the degree of outsourcing, respondents were asked to provide percentages 
ranging from 0% to 100%. For the construct opinion of others, the semantic differential 
approach to measurement was adopted (Osgood et al., 1957) where each response is located 
on an evaluative bipolar (negative-to-positive) dimension, using a seven-point scale. All blocks 
of indicators were formulated in the reflective mode (Chin, 1998a, p. Ix, Chin and Newsted, 
1999, p. 310, Fornell, 1989, p. 161). The unit of analysis was the respective application service. 
Applications development was introduced as the definition, design, and implementation of 
customized software as well as the analysis, selection, and tailoring of standardized software 
packages (e.g. SAP R/3), while applications maintenance was referred to as all corrective, 
adaptive, and perfective (i.e., optimizing) modifications of application software that do not 
include any functional enhancements (Bansler and Havn, 1994, Swanson and Beath, 1989). 
Table 3.  Questionnaire Measures 
Construct Source Sample Item 
Degree of 
Outsourcing 
Based on Teng, 
et al. (1995) and 
Dibbern and 
Heinzl (2001) 
For each of the two IS functions, please estimate the average 
percentage currently allocated to external service providers in terms of 
1. . . .  the function’s total budget (from 0 to 100%) 
2. . . .  total person working days. 
3. . . .  total number of people that participate in doing the work. 
Comparative 
in-house 
systemic 
impact 
advantage 
Newly formed 
based on general 
systems theory 
(Bertalanffy, 
1979) 
If this IS function is not performed in-house but externally, 
1. . . . the integration of this IS function into the overall IS function of 
our organization is weakened. 
2. . . . the synergetic effects to other IS functions will be threatened. 
3. . . . the overall performance of our entire IS function will be greatly 
affected. 
Comparative 
in-house 
advantage in 
systemic 
view 
capability 
Newly formed 
based on 
concepts of 
systems thinking 
(Sterman, 2000, 
Wolstenholme, 
2003) 
In doing the actual work required for each of the IS functions, our own 
employees tend much more than personnel of external service 
providers to 
1. . . . have a systems view of the organization. 
2. . . . have an organization wide perspective of how work in different 
areas effect one another. 
3. . . . consider the task interdependencies in our organization. 
4. . . . have an integrated view of the organization. 
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Comparative 
in-house 
production 
cost 
advantage 
Based on Ang 
and Straub 
(1998) 
In doing the actual work required for each of the IS functions 
1. . . . our internal staff works more cost efficient than an external 
service provider.  
2. . . . we can realize higher economies of scale internally than an 
external service provider. 
Comparative 
in-house 
transaction 
cost 
advantage 
Based on Ang 
and Straub 
(1998) 
When delegating i.e. transferring tasks of the particular IS function 
1. . . . the costs incurred in negotiating, managing and coordinating 
are lower within the firm than in case of contracting with an external 
service provider 
2. . . . less transaction costs are incurred for internal employees than 
when using an external service provider. 
Outsourcing 
decision 
process 
control 
Based on Ajzen 
(1991), Ajzen 
and Fishbein 
(1980), Cordano 
and Hanzen 
Frieze (2000) 
When it comes to outsourcing this IS function to an external service 
provider 
1. . . . our organization can act unrestrictedly. 
2. . . . there are no impediments to our organization. 
Opinion of 
Influential 
Others 
Based on Ajzen 
(1991) ,Ajzen 
and Fishbein 
(1980) 
Persons or groups whose opinion is important to our organization think 
that outsourcing this particular IS function is  
1. . . .bad—good (-3 to +3). 
2. . . . negative—positive. 
3. . . . harmful—beneficial. 
4. . . . foolish—wise. 
5. . . . illogical—logical. 
6. . . . worthless—valuable. 
Firm size Based on Ang 
and Straub 
(1998) 
Please estimate your organization's overall number of employees. 
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Group Comparison Procedure 
The model testing was done with PLS (PLS Graph 3.0, Version 1130). PLS was favored over 
covariance-based SEM for several reasons. First, the sample size of the United States data set 
is lower than 200 (the recommended minimum size for covariance-based SEM), whereas PLS 
can produce consistent results with sample sizes as low as 17 (Majchrak  et al., 2005). 
Second, the data points of this study do not follow a multivariate normal distribution4 which is 
assumed for covariance-based SEM, but not for PLS (Chin, 1998b). Third, in this study, the 
observations are not truly independent from each other, since the same respondent answered 
each question for both the development and maintenance. PLS does not assume 
independence of cases nor that any two cases have equivalent residual distributions (Chin, 
1998b, p. 315). 
 
While these are points that clearly suggest using PLS in this study, there is one limitation. To 
date, multi-group comparisons of PLS models, in which differences in path estimates for 
sampled populations were examined, have been relatively “naïve”. Often, researchers simply 
examine and discuss the differences in the path estimates for two or more data sets. When 
assessing the significance of the differences, a procedure based on the t-test using the pooled 
standard errors obtained via a resampling procedure such as bootstrapping from each sample 
is made (e.g. Keil et al., 2000). Yet, this procedure is valid only under the assumption of normal 
population or similar sample size.  
 
Recently, Chin (2003) proposed an alternative distribution free approach of applying a random 
permutation procedure to overcome these limitations. Chin noted that randomization or 
                                                
4 Mardia’s (1970) coefficient of multivariate kurtosis for Germany was 122.61, c.r. = 30.14 and for the 
U.S was 74.50, c.r. = 9.95; . 
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permutation tests among statisticians are the preferred tests of significance for non-normal 
data. Moreover, random permutation procedures should not be viewed as alternatives to 
parametric statistical tests currently used. Rather, they should be considered as preferred for 
data that do not conform to normal distributional assumptions. The availability of fast 
computers has made permutation tests increasingly feasible, even for large data sets. Since 
such methods require no particular assumptions concerning statistical distributions, 
permutation tests are increasingly applied even in the context of traditional statistical tests (e.g. 
correlation, t-tests, ANOVAS, etc.). Detailed discussion of permutation tests can be found in 
Edgington (1987, p. 1) and Good (2000, p. 25). In general, a permutation test based on 
randomization, as Edgington (1987, p. 5) notes,  “is valid for any kind of sample, regardless of 
how the sample is selected.” This is an extremely important property because the use of 
nonrandom samples is common in surveys as well as experimental studies and would 
otherwise invalidate the use of paramertric statistical tables (e.g., t or F tables).  Essentially, the 
random sampling assumption underlying these significance tables states that all possible 
samples of n cases within a specified population have the same probability of being drawn 
which is not always tenable. 
5.  Results of Data Analysis 
Descriptive Findings 
Table 4 offers insights into the company characteristics of our sample. The data reveals that 
senior IS executives in the United States have a shorter tenure (10.5 years) than in Germany 
(15.9 years). Corporate size and the size of the IS function are significantly larger in the United 
States compared to Germany.  
 
Table 4.  Company Characteristics 
 Germany United States 
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 Mean Std. Mean Std. 
CIO Company Membership (in Years) 15.9 11.5 10.5 8.4 
Entire Organization 2658 5619 4476 9622 
Entire IS Function 88 160 239 796 
Applications Development 28 59 137 635 
Number of Employees in 
Applications Maintenance 27 55 49 161 
 
The larger size of the IS function in the United States can partially be attributed to a lower 
degree of IS outsourcing in applications development and maintenance. Table 5 shows that the 
German organizations of our sample spent about twice as much money on outsourcing their IS 
development and maintenance functions. 
Table 5.  Outsourcing Behavior 
Germany United States 
Variable 
Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Current budget spent on outsourcing (in %) 40.1% 34.2 17.7% 27.3 
Expected change in outsourcing expenditure in 1 year (in %) 3.6% 19.3 3.6% 16.4 
Percentage of former in-house employees transferred to external 
vendor in case of outsourcing (in %) 6.8% 18.9 6.9% 22.4 
Capital share in external vendor (in %) 10.8% 25.4 10.9% 25.1 
No. of Contracts in Last 5 Years 10.1 19.2 11.1 19.0 
No. of Decisions Against Outsourcing  in Last 5 Years 5.1 8.4 2.1 2.7 
 
Other sourcing peculiarities such as equity arrangements, where a certain amount of capital is 
exchanged between vendor and client, average number of employees transferred to external 
vendor in case of outsourcing and contracting experiences (no. of contracts signed within last 
five years) were quite similar between the German and United States sample. Only decisions 
against outsourcing were more often made in Germany in the last five years. 
 
Finally, Table 6 shows the summed averages and standard deviations (Std.) of the constructs 
of the theoretical model. In line with the lower level of outsourcing in the Unites States, the 
United States shows a higher level of perceived in-house advantages in production costs and 
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transaction costs as well as in systemic impact and systemic view capabilities. Moreover, 
control over the outsourcing decision is perceived as lower and the opinion of others is 
negative on average in the United States as opposed to positive in Germany. The question is 
raised, however, whether these factors have indeed a significant influence on the sourcing 
choice in both countries and whether those linkages that were proposed to be culturally 
sensitive do indeed show significant differences between Germany and the United States  
Table 6.  Summed Averages and Standard Deviations for Theoretical Constructs 
Germany United States Construct Scale 
Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Degree of Outsourcing (0-100%) 38.74 34.29 16.61 24.69 
Comparative In-house Systemic Impact Advantage (+2 to -2) -0.08 1.12 0.56 1.14 
Comparative In-house Systemic View Advantage (+2 to -2) 0.92 0.88 1.33 0.77 
Comparative In-house Production Cost Advantage (+2 to -2) 0.67 1.09 1.02 1.11 
Comparative In-house Transaction Cost Advantage (+2 to -2) 0.77 1.00 0.98 0.91 
Outsourcing Process Control (+2 to -2) -0.11 1.02 -0.22 1.19 
Opinion of Others towards Outsourcing (+3 to -3) 0.40 1.24 -0.41 1.42 
 
Results of PLS Estimation 
We will now examine the results of the model testing for both Germany and the United States 
beginning with the test of (1) the measurement model followed by (2) the structural model in 
both countries, and finally (3) the test of differences in the structural paths between both 
countries. 
 
Measurement Model. In order to check whether the indicators of each construct measure what 
they are supposed to measure, tests for convergent and discriminant validity were performed in 
both the German and United States sample. Before doing any multi-group comparisons, it is 
important to examine whether the measures perform adequately in both data samples.  
 
In terms of convergent validity (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982, p. 468), both indicator reliability and 
construct reliability were assessed (Peter, 1981, p. 65). Indicator reliability was examined by 
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looking at the construct loadings. All loadings are significant at the 0.01 level and above the 
recommended 0.7 parameter value (Significance tests were conducted using the bootstrap 
routine with 500 resamples (Chin, 1998b)). Construct reliability and validity was tested using 
two indices: (1) the composite reliability (CR) and (2) the average variance extracted (AVE). All 
the estimated indices were above the threshold (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) of 0.6 for CR and 0.5 
for AVE (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Indicator and Construct Reliability 
Germany United States Construct Item 
Loading CR AVE Loading CR AVE 
Out1 0.96 0.95 
Out2 0.96 0.98 Degree of Outsourcing 
Out3 0.96 
0.97 0.93 
0.94 
0.97 0.91 
Impact1 0.89 0.92 
Impact2 0.89 0.90 Systemic Impact Advantage 
Impact3 0.86 
0.91 0.78 
0.94 
0.94 0.85 
EmplOri1 0.77 0.77 
EmplOri2 0.87 0.84 
EmplOri3 0.83 0.91 
Systemic View Advantage 
EmplOri4 0.89 
0.91 0.71 
0.89 
0.91 0.73 
Pc1 0.81 0.86 
Pc3 0.82 0.85 Production Cost Advantage 
Pc4 0.82 
0.86 0.67 
0.62 
0.83 0.62 
Tc1 0.90 0.70 Transaction Cost Advantage 
Tc4 0.82 
0.85 0.74 
0.97 
0.83 0.71 
Other1 0.92 0.93 
Other2 0.93 0.92 
Other3 0.92 0.93 
Other4 0.89 0.97 
Other5 0.88 0.96 
External Influence 
Other6 0.89 
0.97 0.82 
0.90 
0.98 0.87 
CoPro2 0.90 0.86 Outsourcing Process Control 
CoPro1 0.97 
0.93 0.87 
0.99 
0.93 0.87 
 
Finally, the discriminant validity of the construct items was assessed by looking at the cross-
loadings. They are obtained by correlating the component scores of each latent variable with 
both their respective block of indicators and all other items that are included in the model (Chin, 
 33 
1998b, p. 321). In Table 8 and 9 (see Appendix), the cross loadings for both Germany and the 
United States are presented. The loadings on their respective constructs are shadowed. 
Moving across the rows reveals that each item loads higher on its respective construct than on 
any other construct. Going down a column also shows that a particular construct loads highest 
with its own item. Taken together, this implies discriminant validity for both samples. 
 
Structural Model. Having gained confidence that the measures are appropriate for the German 
and United States sample, the next step is to test the explanatory power of the entire model on 
IS sourcing as well as the predictive power of the independent variables in both countries. The 
explanatory power is examined by looking at the squared multiple correlations (R2) of the main 
dependent variable, the degree of IS outsourcing. It can be concluded from Figure 3 that 33% 
of the variation in the degree of outsourcing (R2 = 0.33) are explained by the independent 
variables in Germany, wheras 27% can be explained in the United States sample (R2 = 0.27). 
The hypotheses are tested by examining the magnitude of the standardized parameter 
estimates between constructs together with the corresponding t-values that indicate the level of 
significance (t-values were obtained through the bootstrap routine, (Chin, 1998b, p. 320)). An 
overview of the results can be obtained from Table 10. Moreover, Figure 3 shows a graphical 
represenation of the findings for the United States and Germany, respectively.   
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Figure 3.  Structural Model Findings for United States versus Germany 
 
The findings show solid support for the “Efficiency and Effectiveness hypotheses” in Germany. 
All of the path coefficients show the expected negative sign and are significant at the 0.05 (**) 
or 0.01 (***) level. Notably, perceived comparative in-house advantages in the systemic impact 
have the strongest impact (H3: -0.23, t = 3.67). The impact of “Environmental Influences and 
Constraints” is less consistent. While solid support can be found for the opinion of others on the 
degree of outsourcing (H5: 0,20, t = 3.93), the link between outsourcing process control and 
degree of outsourcing is negative instead of positive as predicted in the model. Moreover, firm 
size has no impact. 
 
In the United States, more deviations from the hypotheses were found. Comparative 
advantages of in-house professionals in the systemic view are positively related to the degree 
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of outsourcing and not negatively, as predicted. Moreover, in contrast to Germany, no evidence 
can be found for the significant impact of comparative transaction cost advantages and 
systemic impact advantages, as well as for outsourcing process control. Firm size has no 
impact, either. 
 
Significance of Group Differences. The main question is, however, whether the observed 
differences between Germany and the United States are significant and whether those 
differences are in line with the proposed cultural differences (Hypotheses 7-9). This can be 
deduced from the right column of Table 10. It shows the level of probability (P) with which the 
hypotheses that the differences in the parameter estimates for both countries equal zero (i.e., 
the Null-hypothesis) is true. This probability (scaled from 0 to 100) should be limited to a critical 
distance of 1% (P<= 1), 5% (P <= 5), or 10% (P <= 10) (Mohr, 1991). 
 
As hypothesized, only the three culturally sensitive paths (H7-9) were found to have statistically 
significant differences between Germany and the United States. Five of the eight structural 
paths that were assumed to be equivalent for both countries were found to be non-significantly 
different. The probability of exactly matching the eight hypotheses is one in 256 (i.e., 0.39 
percent). The results for the path coefficient from systemic impact advantage to degree of 
outsourcing (H1) in the structural model for Germany is significantly stronger (P=2.5, p<=0.05) 
than the corresponding path in the structural model for the United States, supporting H7 at the 
0.05 level of significance. Likewise, the link between process control and degree of outsourcing 
is significantly stronger (P=7.9, p<=0.1) in Germany than in the United States. While this 
supports H9, it should be considered that the directional link is the opposite to H9 in Germany. 
Finally, H8 is also supported partially. It was proposed that a negative link between systemic 
view advantage and degree of outsourcing exists and that it will be stronger in Germany than in 
the United States. However, the results show that not the strength, but the direction of that link 
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is significantly different between Germany and the United States (P=0.3, p<=0.01). It is 
negative in Germany (as predicted), while positive in the United States. 
 
Table 10: PLS Results for Structural Model and Group Comparison 
   Germany 
(n = 278) 
United 
States 
(n = 82) 
Country 
Difference 
Hypothesis Path 
t-value 
Path 
t-value 
Δ Path 
P-value 
In-house H1 (-)  -0.23 *** 0.08  -0.31 ** 
systemic impact advantage  → Degree of outsourcing 3.67  0.54  2.5 H7 
In-house H2a (-)  -0.15 ** 0.26 ** -0.40 *** 
systemic view advantage  → Degree of outsourcing 1.98  2.11  0.3 H8 
In-house H2b (+) In-house 0.49 *** 0.41 *** 0.08  
systemic view advantage  → systemic impact advantage 11.38  3.86  17.1  
In-house H3 (-)  -0.13 ** -0.29 ** 0.17  
production cost advantage → Degree of outsourcing 1.86  2.05  13.0  
In-house H4 (-)  -0.10 ** -0.20  0.10  
transaction cost advantage  → Degree of outsourcing 1.66  1.23  25.2  
 H5 (+)  0.20 *** 0.30 ** -0.10  
Opinion of others  → Degree of outsourcing 3.93  2.31  20.9  
 H6 (+)  -0.16 ** 0.02  -0.18 * 
Process Control  → Degree of outsourcing 2.22  0.21  7.9 H9 
   -0.04  0.10  -0.14  
Firm size  → Degree of outsourcing 1.08  0.65  12.0  
 
The same analysis of country differences between Germany and the United States was 
performed for each function (development and maintenance) separately (See Table 11). The 
results are similar to those of the aggregated data sets. Analogous to the aggregated data sets, 
the strongest differences can be seen in H2a between both countries, which is statistically 
significant for both functions. Moreover, the path of H1 differs at the 0.05 level in maintenance 
and about at the 0.1 level in development. H6 was only found to differ significantly in 
applications development. Moreover, it is notable that the “opinion of others” has a significantly 
stronger influence in the United States with regard to the outsourcing of applications 
development. Finally, in the United States, production cost savings are more important for 
applications maintenance than in Germany, where systemic influences play the most important 
role. Overall, when comparing the United States and Germany at the functional level, it is 
striking how consistent the findings are with regard to the different impact of systemic 
influences between both countries. 
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Table 11: Group Comparison for each Function 
Maintenance Development 
GER United States 
Country 
Diff. p-value GER 
United 
States 
Country 
Diff. p-value 
Hypotheses 
Path  Path  Δ Path   Path  Path  Δ Path   
H1 (-) -0.24 *** 0.15 -0.39 4.57 **  (H7) -0.23 *** 0.03  -0.26 11.62 * (H7) 
H2a(-) -0.24 *** 0.28 * -0.52 0.25 *** (H8) -0.15 ** 0.33 ** -0.47 5.26 * (H8) 
H2b (+) 0.44 *** 0.36 ** 0.07 26.27  0.49 *** 0.46 *** 0.03 17.99 
H3 (-) -0.07 -0.36 * 0.28 10.23 * -0.13 ** -0.24  0.12 38.53 
H4 (-) -0.11 -0.24 0.13 27.97  -0.10 * -0.18  0.09 44.44 
H5 (+) 0.14 * 0.11 0.03 43.81  0.20 *** 0.56 *** -0.36 2.30 ** 
H6 (+) -0.17 * -0.05 -0.12 30.43  -0.16 *** 0.09  -0.25 10.37 * (H9) 
Firm size -0.07 * 0.12 -0.19 15.19  -0.04 0.02  -0.05 46.74 
 
Results from Control for Industry and IS functional differences 
We also tested the model for each industry and each IS function separately and examined 
whether the results for the structural paths differed significantly. When comparing the IS 
functions (n=180 for each) only one path turned out to be slightly different (p<=0.1). This was 
the path between opinion of others and degree of outsourcing (H5), which was 0.28 for 
development and 0.16 for maintenance. When comparing industries it appeared that systemic 
influences were in the expected direction (negative) for both samples, but only significant for 
the Finance industry. These differences between industries were weakly significant (p<0.10). 
Moreover, process control had a negative impact on outsourcing in the Finance industry, while 
being insignificant for the Machinery industry (the difference was significant at the 0.05 level). 
Overall, these controls show that the differences between paths are considerably stronger 
between the countries than between IS functions and industries.  
6.  Discussion and Implications 
In the following, the results of the model testing will be discussed and interpreted. In line with 
our research objectives we are particularly interested in the relative importance of IS 
outsourcing determinants, the role of systemic influences as new determinants to the IS 
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outsourcing literature and the cross-cultural differences. Since the differences between 
countries turned out to be very strong for some relationships, we separate the discussion of 
results into the common findings across countries and country-level differences.  
Commonalities. In both the German and the United States samples, differences in production 
costs between in-house provision and outsourcing have a significant impact on the sourcing of 
application services. This substantiates the findings from previous empirical studies (Ang and 
Straub, 1998, Apte et al., 1997, Clark et al., 1995, Lacity and Willcocks, 1998, McLellan et al., 
1995). Notably, the descriptive results have shown that, on average, production costs are 
perceived lower in-house which is in contrast to Williamson’s (1981) assertion that economies 
of scale and scope could generally be better achieved through the market. This study also 
supports findings from previous empirical studies that production costs are more influential on 
the sourcing choice than transaction costs (Ang and Straub, 1998). One reason for the different 
level of importance of the two types of costs within decision making could be that it is much 
harder for organizations to estimate transaction costs. They often appear as hidden or extra 
costs in later stages of the actual service delivery e.g. in the form of increased control and 
coordination effort (Barthélemy, 2001, Dibbern et al., 2008). In both Germany and the United 
States production costs play a more important role than transaction costs.  
 
It is instructive to note, however, that the opinion of others plays at least an equally important 
role as production costs in the United States or even a more important role for the IS 
outsourcing decision in Germany. This could be explained by the fact that IS outsourcing is 
often associated with a certain level of uncertainty, e.g. about the true cost of outsourcing, and 
hence organizations often actively seek the advice of external stakeholders, such as from 
consultants or from peer organizations. The negative side of these external impacts, however, 
may not be overlooked. There is the danger that organizations unknowingly conform to external 
opinions. From a theoretical point of view it is notable that this study confirms that selected 
dimensions from an individual level theory, namely the theory of planned behavior, can help to 
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explain firm behavior, when adapted to the organizational context (see also Cordano and 
Frieze Hanson, 2000).  
 
Country Differences.  Notably, all three determinants that were hypothesized to be culturally 
sensitive indeed showed significant differences in the structural paths between Germany and 
the United States (H7-9). When looking at the two systemic factors the differences showed up 
particularly strong. First of all, while perceived in-house advantages in the systemic impact of 
an IS function were found to impede the extent to which application services are outsourced in 
Germany, the relationship was found to be irrelevant in the United States. This country 
difference is consistent with the perspective that in countries which are characterized by a very 
high level of individualism and a more analytical view of the firm, the focus is more on 
evaluating the quality and the performance of particular IS functions rather than the integrated 
performance of all functions working together. Accordingly, the systemic consequences of the 
outsourcing of particular IS functions, such as applications development or maintenance, are 
not explicitly factored into the sourcing choice. By contrast, in Germany which is more 
collectivist in nature and more characterized by an integrative view of the organization, the 
implications of outsourcing a particular IS function for overall systems performance are 
explicitly recognized.  
 
The results further show, however, that this does not mean that systemic influences are 
generally ignored in highly individualistic countries. They are recognized in form of individual 
capabilities. And yet, the way in which systemic view capabilities are factored into the sourcing 
decision appears to strongly differ between highly and less individualistic countries. Germany, 
with a more integrative view and collectivist culture is less likely (more negative path) to 
outsource an IS function if IS managers perceive a systemic view advantage exists for their 
company employees relative to outsourced professionals. In contrast, in the United States, 
application services are outsourced although in-house personnel are seen as superior in 
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systemic thinking. Obviously, the moderating impact of culture in terms of individualism versus 
collectivism and analytical versus integrative perspectives is so strong that the direction of the 
relationship is converted from negative to positive in the United States. In explaining this 
discrepancy, it should be noted that systemic view capabilities may not be seen as a required 
trait for all IS professionals. Indeed, too much systemic thinking may also have negative 
consequences because it prevents IS personnel from staying focused on their particular task, 
e.g. concentrating on just one particular software component or module rather than thinking in 
terms of the entire system. One may further argue that systemic thinking may be the task of 
specialized groups. Examples are systems analysts that need to have a good understanding of 
both the technology domain and the application domain or systems architects that need to 
understand the interfaces between all IS sub-components working together. The preference for 
providing this quality by a small unit of specialized systems analysts and architects may be 
particularly high in individualistic nations like the United States. In these cultures, clear roles 
and responsibilities are preferred based on the belief that tasks can unrestrictedly be broken 
down and delegated to specialized work forces. The personnel of external vendors may not be 
required to have strong systemic view capabilities if the tasks are clearly specified by the client 
that keeps the responsibility for the alignment of business and IT objectives. The specification 
may be carried out by a small group of remaining in-house systems analysts and architects that 
serves as a bridge between the various IS functions but also between the technology domain 
and the business domain. The analytical culture of United States businesses based on the 
division of labor would ensure that the systemic view is accounted for by a specific group of 
employees – namely management – within the firm (Hofstede, 1993). Therefore, this is not a 
required trait for the majority of IS professionals. In other words, individualist cultures do 
consider the systemic capability necessary to ensure IS systems fit integrative into the firm, but 
not as a general quality of IS personnel. Indeed, the majority of IS professionals may be 
required to stay focused and perform their particular functions as specified. This explains why 
the majority of an IS function may be outsourced in the United States although systemic 
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capabilities are seen superior in-house – and, vice versa, application services are kept in-
house, although no systemic view advantages are seen in-house, because such capabilities 
are not seen as required trait for all IS personnel. 
 
Another relationship that was found to be culturally sensitive is the link between outsourcing 
process control and degree of outsourcing. It was proposed that a higher level of perceived 
control over the outsourcing process would be positively related with the degree of outsourcing 
and that this link would be stronger in Germany than in the United States. Interestingly, there 
was a significant difference in the impact of that link between Germany and the United States 
But, unexpectedly, this link was slightly positive but non-significant in the United States, while 
being negative in Germany. In other words, German organizations show a higher level of 
outsourcing though IS executives do not believe that their organization has full control over all 
necessary activities associated with outsourcing. One explanation for this reversed link could 
be that in cultures where the influence of the internal works council and other labor regularity 
forces is particularly high, organizations may see outsourcing as a viable option to increase 
organizational flexibility. That is, managers may choose outsourcing in response to low internal 
flexibility in hiring and dismissing IS professionals when needed, e.g. due to variations in 
workload. Such inflexibility is particularly high in countries with a high level of regulatory labor 
forces. While outsourcing decisions may be hard to fight through in highly labor regulated 
countries, decision flexibility is increased once outsourcing is accomplished because IS 
professionals are then engaged on a contractual basis independent of internal work councils. 
This then puts a critical light on legislation in countries such as Germany, which enforces 
organizations to choose organizational arrangements that may not be optimal solutions from an 
economic or strategic point of view if the labor market were less regulated, as is the case of the 
United States. 
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From a statistical perspective, the differences that we found between the two countries with the 
structural paths shifting from one direction to the other or to a non-significant level are typical of 
interaction effects. Traditional hypothesized effects, by definition, are assumed to change due 
to the moderator variable. Labeled as a disordinal interaction (Jaccard et al., 1990, pp. 75-78), 
whether the paths for both countries are in the same direction, opposite, or non-significant is 
mainly contingent on the impact strength of the moderator. Given a specific starting point for 
one country, the stronger the cultural differences, the greater the likelihood that the path for the 
other country would move towards either a non-significant path or opposite sign, as was found 
in our study (Baron and Kenny, 1986).  
Managerial Implications 
Overall, it can be stated that the question regarding the sourcing of application software 
services is a multidimensional managerial problem which is significantly influenced by cultural 
contingencies. Multinational client organizations, which prepare for outsourcing decisions as 
well as internationally oriented IS vendors, should carefully look at IS sourcing from three 
perspectives integrated in our model: (1) efficiency, (2) effectiveness, and (3) environmental 
influences and constraints. 
 
Comparative production cost and transaction cost advantages, as well as the opinion of 
influential individuals are largely culturally insensitive, and remain key determinants for the 
outsourcing decision. However, systemic aspects as well as the client’s ability to fully control 
the outsourcing process as a constraint should be factored into the outsourcing decision when 
extending outsourcing strategies globally. Since the systemic view capability of IS 
professionals has a direct impact on the outsourcing decision, attributes of the corporate and IS 
workforce in each country organization which will be involved in the outsourcing contract 
should be carefully analyzed. In countries which are more integrative and collectivistic rather 
than analytical and individualistic, e.g. in Germany, Switzerland, or France, systemic view 
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capabilities are generally seen as valuable.  Accordingly, vendors need to ensure that their 
work forces cooperate closely with client organizations and quickly develop a good 
understanding of the client’s “work system”. Sending inexperienced personnel to the client with 
little domain knowledge and hence low capacity for systemic view capabilities may be 
particularly counterproductive. In other words, the vendor has to anticipate the client’s 
expectations and demonstrate strong systemic view capabilities early on when approaching 
customers. By contrast, when attracting United States clients the focus may be more on 
signaling strong management capabilities that would ensure good relationships with the client’s 
management team so that systemic requirements of the client are appropriately accounted for. 
It is important to note, however, that this should not be seen as a normative recommendation 
for all IS sourcing decisions, since the question remains to be open how exactly systemic 
influences should be addressed by organizations in an optimal way. It appears, however, that 
United States and German organizations are setting different priorities and this should be taken 
into account both by vendors and clients when transferring sourcing approaches and strategies 
across national boundaries. 
 
Moreover, internationally oriented clients and vendors should take environmental differences 
between countries into consideration. In country environments that face a high level of 
unionization and codetermination, this aspect has to be taken into account explicitly. Since the 
legal environment cannot be changed easily like individual perceptions, specific bargaining 
capabilities have to be built up in order to cope with such legal constraints. The significant 
growth of IS outsourcing in spite of more restrictive legal surroundings in Germany shows that 
organizations are innovative in overcoming legal barriers. Third party advice may be 
recommended in order to adequately address such specific legal issues. 
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Study Limitations 
Although the findings of this study emerged from a well grounded statistical analysis, it is not 
necessarily a complete causal analysis. Rather, it is a snapshot of the sourcing behavior of 
United States and German companies which takes cultural patterns into consideration. Since 
other cultural realms have not been addressed in this research, the generalizability of the 
results has to be treated with some caution. It should also be noted that the United States was 
one of the first movers in IS outsourcing and that generally more experiences of United States 
firms with outsourcing may have had an impact on our model testing results. Moreover, this 
research focused on just two particular industries, manufacturing and financial services, and on 
just two IS functions, applications development and applications maintenance. Furthermore, 
despite all counter-efforts which have been described in the method section of this paper, the 
response rate in the United States sample may still be a factor. In particular the relatively low 
average degree of outsourcing of application services in the United States sample may not be 
representative for a larger population.  
 
It also has to be taken into consideration that the differences in cultural profiles were 
determined inductively from archival data. Accordingly, confirmation of the proposed cultural 
differences in the structural paths of the IS sourcing model “… does not rule out the possibility 
that the inductive characterization of the cultural groups may be invalid” (Janssens et al., 
1995). While the team of authors is made up by representatives of both cultures, Germany and 
the United States, the development of the framework and the interpretation of the results may 
still be affected by the respective cultural perceptions and values. These limitations call for 
further cross-cultural research in IS outsourcing and for studies that explicitly consider cultural 
dimensions in their research.  
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Future Research 
One promising avenue for such an endeavor is to incorporate more variables at the individual 
IS professional level into mid-range theories on IS sourcing (Ang and Slaughter, 2001). These 
individual level variables could be deduced from cross-cultural research and explicitly deployed 
as moderators or mediators. The incorporation of such variables would increase the 
generalizability of mid-range theories of IS sourcing. Furthermore, multiple case studies may 
complement our survey approach in a useful way. Those case studies may focus on 
multinational or global outsourcing deals. In multinational outsourcing deals, one could analyze 
how the expectations associated with outsourcing and the management of the relationship 
differ between the countries involved in the global deal – in particular when a single vendor is 
chosen that seeks to apply the same relationship management techniques worldwide. 
Alternatively, the client location or organization could be held constant and the vendor location 
could be varied. This would be particularly interesting in light of the fast emerging practice of IS 
offshoring. For example, the question may be raised whether systemic view capabilities differ 
between vendors from different countries and whether the client is factoring such differences 
into its sourcing decision. The study by Kumar et al. (1990) on differences in IS design values 
may be informative for incorporating other IS specific culturally sensitive dimensions (see also 
Leidner and Kayworth, 2006). From our perspective, it has been very useful that the authors of 
this paper stem from the two cultural domains analyzed. Such a cross-cultural composition of 
researchers is recommendable for future cross-cultural research in order to capture the 
richness and diversity of the cultural phenomena involved (Pauleen et al., 2006). As suggested, 
there are plenty of research opportunities ahead which should be addressed by future 
research.  
7.  Conclusion 
Based on our study, we can draw a number of conclusions. First, the comparison of three 
different theoretical perspectives of IS outsourcing determination has shown that efficiency is 
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not the dominant factor. While production costs play a significant role across countries, external 
influences, such as the opinion of referential others, are at least as important. In addition, 
effectiveness as exemplified by the systemic impact of IS and the systemic view capability of IS 
personnel was found to be a key factor. These systemic influences, however, were found to be 
highly culture related. In more collectivist nations, such as Germany, where organizational 
members tend to have more of an integrative view of the corporation, decision makers consider 
how overall system performance is affected through the outsourcing of particular IS sub-
functions, such as systems development or maintenance. By contrast, in highly individualistic 
countries, such as the United States, the focus may be more on the effectiveness of particular 
IS functions, e.g. the reliability and quality of a software application, rather than its fit with other 
functions and systems throughout the corporation. And yet, systemic influences are not ignored 
in strongly individualistic countries. They are accounted for at the individual level in form of 
systemic thinking capability that is in the hand of a group of specialists, such as systems 
analysts or architects that take care of systemic influences. Contrastingly, systemic thinking is 
seen as a generally valued capability of system developers and maintenance personnel in 
more collectivist nations, such as Germany. Thus, there is a stark contrast in the way systemic 
influences are considered in the outsourcing decision between organizations in more and less 
individualistic (i.e., collectivistic) nations. From a theoretical point of view, the effect of systemic 
influences on IS outsourcing behavior supports the resource-based view, holding that client 
and vendor firms may have different capabilities in effectively providing IS services. The 
recognition of systemic influences is one important part in achieving IS effectiveness. It 
provides a starting point for elaborating on IS-specific determinants in explaining heterogonous 
IS outsourcing among organizations. Both systems theory and the theory of modularity may 
provide fruitful lenses to further examine the conditions under which systemic influences are 
better recognized in-house compared through outsourcing (and vice versa). The integration of 
the contingency theory perspective could be useful in this realm. Accordingly, this research 
calls for searching for idiosyncratic IS factors in IS outsourcing research. Further, the influence 
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of cross-cultural differences on mid-range theories of IS outsourcing should be studied more 
intensively in order increase generalizability. Information systems are a combination of 
technology, business functions and people. Any systematic differences in the behavior of 
people should be accounted for in theories about the organization of IS work as well as in IS 
design research. 
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Appendix 
Table 8:  PLS Cross-loadings for German Sample 
  PC TC firm size Out Sys_Imp Control Sys_View Ext_Infl 
Pc1 0.85 0.57 0.05 0.34 0.40 0.16 0.44 0.25 
Pc3 0.88 0.44 0.10 0.38 0.49 0.12 0.42 0.33 
Tc1 0.53 0.90 0.12 0.36 0.33 0.14 0.33 0.30 
Tc4 0.45 0.82 0.03 0.27 0.40 0.06 0.39 0.29 
No_All 0.09 0.07 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.00 
Out1 0.40 0.36 0.03 0.96 0.41 0.05 0.35 0.36 
Out2 0.41 0.37 0.01 0.96 0.43 0.04 0.38 0.32 
Out3 0.38 0.36 0.02 0.96 0.41 0.04 0.37 0.38 
Impact1 0.51 0.41 0.03 0.38 0.89 0.24 0.46 0.21 
Impact2 0.46 0.36 0.03 0.41 0.89 0.14 0.44 0.28 
Impact3 0.40 0.34 0.02 0.35 0.86 0.16 0.41 0.22 
CoPro1 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.97 0.17 0.05 
CoPro2 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.21 0.90 0.17 0.05 
EmplOri1 0.34 0.36 0.08 0.23 0.40 0.15 0.77 0.18 
EmplOri2 0.47 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.41 0.08 0.87 0.31 
EmplOri3 0.41 0.31 0.03 0.33 0.39 0.22 0.83 0.17 
EmplOri4 0.44 0.34 0.14 0.33 0.46 0.15 0.89 0.19 
Other1 0.37 0.37 0.03 0.34 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.92 
Other2 0.35 0.35 0.03 0.33 0.27 0.07 0.27 0.93 
Other3 0.33 0.31 0.01 0.34 0.27 0.03 0.22 0.92 
Other4 0.26 0.28 0.03 0.33 0.22 0.09 0.22 0.89 
Other5 0.23 0.25 0.03 0.31 0.22 0.06 0.18 0.88 
Other6 0.27 0.32 0.04 0.34 0.21 0.02 0.22 0.89 
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Table 9:  PLS Cross-loadings for United States Sample 
  PC TC firm size Out Sys_Imp Control Sys_View Ext_Infl 
Pc1 0.92 0.39 0.02 0.36 0.53 0.01 0.17 0.30 
Pc3 0.89 0.47 0.02 0.31 0.59 0.02 0.36 0.33 
Tc1 0.31 0.70 0.02 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.34 0.25 
Tc4 0.46 0.97 0.02 0.30 0.36 0.07 0.35 0.20 
No_All 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.17 
Out1 0.28 0.19 0.25 0.95 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.29 
Out2 0.36 0.33 0.11 0.98 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.32 
Out3 0.41 0.27 0.11 0.94 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.37 
Impact1 0.62 0.40 0.16 0.22 0.92 0.17 0.37 0.34 
Impact2 0.50 0.31 0.00 0.16 0.90 0.11 0.30 0.44 
Impact3 0.56 0.35 0.09 0.14 0.94 0.07 0.44 0.40 
CoPro1 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.13 1.00 0.10 0.01 
CoPro2 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.86 0.04 0.03 
EmplOri1 0.19 0.28 0.12 0.09 0.34 0.19 0.77 0.28 
EmplOri2 0.34 0.44 0.05 0.03 0.31 0.01 0.84 0.28 
EmplOri3 0.25 0.38 0.12 0.11 0.40 0.04 0.91 0.35 
EmplOri4 0.19 0.23 0.08 0.08 0.35 0.12 0.89 0.28 
Other1 0.32 0.25 0.17 0.28 0.39 0.05 0.28 0.93 
Other2 0.35 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.37 0.07 0.24 0.92 
Other3 0.31 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.42 0.05 0.31 0.93 
Other4 0.36 0.27 0.15 0.36 0.42 0.05 0.34 0.97 
Other5 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.34 0.39 0.02 0.41 0.96 
Other6 0.26 0.21 0.08 0.37 0.37 0.10 0.36 0.90 
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